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Recent Developments

TWEEDYv. STATE:

A Trial Judge May Not Impose a Sentence Greater than the
Outlined Punishment of an Accepted Plea Agreement, even
when the Added Condition Immediately Follows the
Defendant's Acceptance
By: James Hanratty
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a trial judge's
imposition of a sentence greater than one already accepted in a plea
agreement is an illegal sentence. Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 845
A.2d 1215 (2004). A trial judge is, therefore, prohibited from adding
any additional conditions to a plea agreement after a defendant has
assented to the terms of the deal, even if the judge's added conditions
immediately follow a defendant's consent. ld.
Millard Tweedy ("Tweedy") was indicted by a Baltimore City
Grand Jury on several narcotics charges, including possession with
the intent to distribute. Subsequent to the indictment, Tweedy
appeared in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and entered a guilty
plea for possession with the intent to distribute. Tweedy's counsel
advised him of the terms of the plea, specifically, that in exchange for
his guilty plea, Tweedy's sentence would be limited to five years with
all but six months suspended. As an additional provision, Tweedy's
sentence would be further reduced if he agreed to perform certain
remedial activities prior to the sentencing date. Tweedy verbally
agreed to the above-stated terms. Thereafter, the trial judge ruled, if
Tweedy failed to appear for sentencing, his sentence would be
increased to the full five-year term. Tweedy failed to appear for
sentencing and the trial judge entered a sentence of five years.
Tweedy filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence and
requested that, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the fiveyear sentence be suspended except for six months. The trial judge
denied Tweedy's motion without a hearing. Thereafter, Tweedy filed
a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which
upheld the trial court's decision in an unreported opinion. The Court
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of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether a trial
judge may impose a sentence greater than that outlined in an
accepted plea agreement.
The court of appeals began its analysis by comparing plea
agreements to contracts, noting that neither may be "unilaterally
broken with impunity or without consequence." Id. at 482, 845 A.2d at
1219. The court explained that plea agreements are commonly
accepted procedures throughout the country, which have been
recognized by the Maryland General Assembly by way of Maryland
Rule 4-243(c). Id. at 484-85,845 A.2d at 1220-21. This Rule states, "the
judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition,
or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement." Id.
Tweedy contended that he accepted the plea agreement before
the trial judge supplemented it with the added requirement of
Tweedy's presence. Id. at 483, 845 A.2d at 1219-20. By contrast, the
State argued, the plea had not yet been accepted by the court;
therefore, the trial judge was free to compel Tweedy's presence at
sentencing as an additional condition of the agreement. [d. The State
further argued that Tweedy's failure to object to the added term
operated as an implied consent. [d.
The court of appeals focused on the chronology of the trial
procedures to establish when the plea agreement was accepted. Id. at
486, 845 A.2d at 1221. The court found Tweedy assented to the terms
of the agreement, the court accepted the plea agreement, and the trial
judge advised Tweedy of the consequences of his failure to appear at
sentencing. [d. Thus, the additional increased punishment occurred
after the plea was accepted and was, therefore, illegaL [d. (Emphasis
added). In this regard, the court of appeals recognized that conditions
requiring appearance at sentencing are valid if the plea agreement is
presented to the defendant and the plea agreement is accepted. Id. at
486-87, 845 A.2d at 1221-22.
Upon this finding, the court of appeals granted Tweedy's
request that the original plea agreement be specifically performed. Id.
at 489, 845 A.2d at 1223. The court stated, "it is well settled that
where the defendant has not received the benefit of a plea bargain to
which he is entitled, the defendant may elect to have the bargain
specifically enforced or withdraw the guilty plea." Id. ~t 488, 845 A.2d
at 1222. Moreover, even though the present case involved a court's
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failure, not a prosecutor's failure, to uphold a plea agreement, the
defendant's options remained the same. Id. at 489,845 A.2d at 1223.
As an additional matter, in dicta, the court expressed its
concern over the trial court's decision to continue with sentencing
despite Tweedy's absence. Id. at 498, 845 A.2d at 1228. The court
explained that sentencing in absentia is contrary to a criminal
defendant's right to be present at every stage of their trial. Id. at 490,
845 A.2d at 1225. The court of appeals also stated that sentencing in
absentia deprives a defendant of the opportunity to explain his/her
absence, thereby limiting the evidence gathering function of the trial
court. Id. at 490, 845 A.2d at 1224. The court utilized the test
established in Pickney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 711 A.2d 205 (1998), for
when a defendant can waive his/her right to be present. [d. at 493, 845
A.2d at 1226. The test requires that the defendant know of the time
and place of the proceeding, and that nonappearance be knowing and
deliberate. Id. at 493, 845 A.2d at 1226. The court must then balance
the interests of efficient criminal justice against the rights of the
defendant. Id. The court of appeals found that only in "extraordinary
cases" after analyzing all of the "relevant circumstances" should in
absentia proceedings be permitted. Id. The trial court's failure to
investigate the reasons for Tweedy's absence and the court's refusal to
employ alternative methods to compel his appearance were
particularly troublesome for the court of appeals. Id. at 498-99, 845
A.2d at 1228-29.
The concurrence by Judge Harrell centered on the issue of in
absentia sentencing and questioned the methodology the majority
employed to invalidate Tweedy's sentence. Id. at 500-01,845 A.2d at
1229-30. The concurrence shared the majority's disfavor of in absentia
criminal proceedings, but favored a holistic view of plea acceptances,
rather than the majority's concentration on a "particular part" of the
plea procedure. Id.
In Tweedy v. State, the court of appeals' view of when a plea is
accepted is based on a rigid, compartmentalized analysis of criminal
proceedings. The court of appeals has established a protocol which
requires that all terms of a plea agreement be stated before the
defendant accepts the offer. This standard will theoretically protect
defendants from harsher sentences after they have pled guilty, but the
practical effects of this decision may lead to an overemphasis on
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procedure. If a judge inadvertently forgets to add a term to the
agreement before the defendant accepts, the omitted term is
eliminated. This standard may prove to be too onerous for trial
judges, who are often faced with large dockets and hectic timetables.
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